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ice is the country’s primary staple. It
is a critical item in the diet of the poor,
accounting for as much as a quarter of the
incomes of the bottom 30 percent of house-
holds. Even in the countryside, which hosts
two out of every three poor persons, most
households remain net buyers of rice. In
recent months, however, the price of rice has
surged: the retail price rose from P25.84/kg
in January to as high as P38.76/kg in July.
While prices have gone down to P36.70/kg by
August, the increase is still a huge 42 per-
cent.1 This bodes ill for the country’s poor,
whose ranks had already swollen to 33
percent of the population by 2006 (up from
30% in 2003). Due to rising food prices
alone, poverty is expected to climb up to 35
percent (Figure 1).2
In response, the government has moved
aggressively in the distribution of subsidized
National Food Authority (NFA) rice, cracked
down on alleged rice “hoarders,” increased
purchases of foreign rice, budgeted massive
outlays for rice production, and even imposed
a temporary moratorium on the conversion of
agricultural land.
This Policy Notes traces the root of this rice
price situation, analyzes the way that the
government has responded and is responding
to it, and offers insights and suggestions on
what should be done.
What got us into this?
There are two sides to the story of the rice
______________
1 Bureau of Agricultural Statistics (BAS), 2008. Updates on
palay, rice and corn prices, August and February issues.
2 National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB). Philippine
poverty statistics, various issues; Balisacan, A., 2008.




crisis. One side is foreign. From 2002 to 2006,
imports averaged 14 percent of domestic
consumption or about 1.3 million tons yearly,
making the country one of the world’s biggest
rice importers.3 Unfortunately, world prices
have soared in recent months. A benchmark
Thai rice (25% broken) was selling for US$869
as of May, about triple its level a year earlier,
before easing somewhat in the succeeding
months.4 As a result of these food price
Figure 1. Official poverty incidence and estimated 2008
poverty (projected from food price increases)
spikes, mass demonstrations and even rioting
had broken out in some poor countries such
as Haiti, Egypt, Burkina Faso, Cameroon,
Bangladesh, and Indonesia, arousing fears
that a similar outbreak may happen here.5
Volatility in world markets is far from new.
The current episode is a dim reminder of the
severe food crisis in 1972 to 1974 (Figure 2).6
This was caused by supply shocks, as harvests
were ravaged by El Niño while production
costs were jacked up by rising oil prices.
Normalization of weather, combined with
production incentive from the high prices, led
to a rebound of supplies, and a retreat of
world prices. The ensuing decades have been
called the era of “cheap rice.”
The year 2001, however, heralded the end of
this era, as world prices started their upward
trend. The current uptrend, unlike that of the
1970s, is being driven by demand growth,
combined with slow growth in supplies.
Nevertheless, the levels reached in recent
months are abnormally high, and are probably
due to short-run imbalances owing to de-
pleted rice stocks, export restraints in major
rice-exporting countries, and choices made by
Figure 2. Real and nominal price of Thai rice (5% broken)
in 1983 US dollars, 1961–April 2008
______________
3 Bureau of Agricultural Statistics, 2008. Cereals supply and
utilization accounts [online, accessed 10 September].
http://countrystat.bas.gov.ph.
4 http://www.riceexporters.or.th/default_eng.htm.
Accessed September 10, 2008.
5 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Asian_Economy/
JE14Dk01.html. Accessed May 15 2008.
6 Thai price data from International Rice Research Institute,
World Rice Statistics, 2008. http://www.irri.org/science/
ricestat/index.asp. Deflated by US Consumer Price Index
available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.
bls.gov/cpi/home.htm#data, accessed September 10, 2008.PN 2008-05
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importing country governments (such as the
Philippines) to maintain or expand reserves.7
One cannot also discount the spillover from
financial market developments, given the
depreciation of the US dollar and the move-
ment of portfolio investors into commodity
speculation.
The country’s price stabilization policies
allowed the government to protect rice
consumers from price shocks in the 1970s; on
the other hand, during the cheap price period,
protectionist policies were put in place to
achieve self-sufficiency and defend rice
farmers. The result was a wedge between
foreign prices and local prices, which widened
in the 1990s. Since the 2000s, that wedge
has been thinning as world prices climb.
Under today’s extraordinary world prices,
domestic rice is now competitive with foreign
rice (Figure 3).8
This brings us to the other side of the
story, which is domestic. Reliance on
world markets is fundamentally due to a
lack of competitiveness of rice produc-
tion. Rice experts have long been
anticipating a food crisis if commodity
prices were to rise sharply—an expecta-
tion which has sadly come true. There is
no dearth of studies dianosing the rice
problem and prescribing policy rem-
edies.9
The first set of reasons behind the lack
of competitiveness is supply side in
nature. The country’s agricultural strat-
egy had failed to attend to the slowdown in
productivity growth, which had been persis-
tently observed from the 1980s and 1990s.
This is in stark comparison to productivity
improvements in the late 1960s and 1970s,
which had led to the brief episode in which
the country became a net exporter of rice.
There remains a significant yield gap, i.e.,
shortfall from potential yield. Estimates of the
yield gap range from 5 – 6 t/ha per season,
attributable to climate, biological constraints
______________
7 Food and Agriculture Organization, 2008. Rice market
monitor XI No. 1. Commodity Markets, Policy Analysis and
Projections Service, Trade and Markets Division, FAO.
8 Thai price is white broken A5 Super [online, accessed 11
September 2008]. http://www.fao.org/es/esc/prices/
PricesServlet.jsp?lang=en. Domestic price is from BAS,
Wholesale Prices of Cereals Monthly/Annual, http://
countrystat.bas.gov.ph. Accessed September 11, 2008.
9 The most recent compilation of studies is: A. Balisacan, L.
Sebastian, and Associates, 2007. Securing rice, reducing
poverty: challenges and policy directions. Southeast Asian
Regional Center for Graduate Studies and Research in
Agriculture (SEARCA), Philippine Rice Research Institute
(PhilRice), and Department of Agriculture – Bureau of
Agricultural Statistics (DA-BAR), College, Los Baños,
Laguna.
Figure 3. Difference between world and domestic prices of rice
(as a proportion of world price), 1991–August 2008PN 2008-05
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(poor seeds, weeds, pests), physical con-
straints (soil nutrients, water management),
and socioeconomic constraints (poor cultural
practices). Overcoming these constraints can
elevate yields by as much as 150 percent.
The second set of reasons is more structural
and demand side in nature. Population is
growing rapidly, causing demand for staples
to outstrip the country’s ability to produce at
competitive cost, thus necessitating imports.
However, purchasing power has stagnated,
particularly in rural areas, due to the weak
growth of employment and income opportuni-
ties both within and outside agriculture.
These factors combine to make a significant
subset of the poor vulnerable to rising world
commodity prices.
Rather than addressing the underlying con-
straints to competitiveness, the policy frame-
work has been oriented toward shielding the
producer from foreign competition through a
regime of trade interventions and subsidies.
These interventions have “burned a hole” in
the public coffers, compromised food
affordability for the poor while failing to
build a strong domestic production base as a
hedge against world price volatility.
How are we dealing with it now?
The policy response to the present crisis may
be characterized as a scaled-up version of
“business as usual.” Massive distribution of
cheap NFA rice is focused on the twelve major
population centers (Metro Manila,  Baguio
City, Lucena City, Legaspi City, Albay,
Tacloban City, Bacolod City, Cebu City,
Dumaguete City, Davao City, Cagayan de Oro,
Zamboanga City, and General Santos City).
Production support, totaling PhP43.7 billion,
adopts the FIELDS strategy, i.e., Fertilizer,
Irrigation and rural infrastructure, Extension
and education, Loans, Dryers and other
postharvest facilities, and Seeds of high-
yielding varieties (Box 1). For rice, the plan
entails essentially an enlargement of the GMA
Rice Program, a program anchored on input
subsidies rather than productivity growth.
Subsidies are a quick way to boost domestic
production, but fail to address deep-seated
productivity problems and impose a heavy
fiscal burden. Even before the current spike,
NFA had long been a black hole for taxpayer’s
money, absorbing PhP14 billion in 2007
Box 1:  The FIELDS Program
Elements of the FIELDS program include:
1. expansion of areas planted with hybrid seeds and certified
seeds, coupled with location-specific measures such as farm
inputs like Bio-N, zinc sulfate, and other soil ameliorants; 
2. restoration of irrigation facilities; provision of postharvest
drying facilities;
3. planting of certified seeds in 600,000 hectares of rainfed low-
lands and low-yielding irrigated areas, which will focus on
the priority provinces covered by the President’s Acceler-
ated Hunger Mitigation Program (AHMP); 
4. third cropping season under the Quick Turnaround (QTA)
Program to cover 92,000-100,000 hectares of fully irrigated
areas using hybrid and inbred certified seeds;  
5. planting of hybrids and inbred certified seeds in restored
and newly irrigated areas covering 60,000 hectares.
______________
Source: http://www.da.gov.ph/wps/portal/da/news?%20 WCM_GLOBAL_
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alone. This year, its subsidy require-
ment would be much bigger, perhaps
by 50 percent. Moreover, commod-
ity-specific subsidies are not cost-
effective, given their proneness to
leakage and high distribution cost.
Neither is targeting toward urban
centers the appropriate way to reach
the neediest, as incidence and
severity of poverty in these centers
tend to be far lower than in the
countryside.
What is at stake?
Philippine rice agriculture is at a crossroads,
between maintaining “business as usual,” and
alternative futures involving: a) a scenario
with improved market access or MA (due to
progress in international trade liberalization);
and b) a scenario with improved market
access combined with domestic reforms in
governance and investment in agricultural
productivity or GMR. A scenario analysis
suggests the following:
z Yields, agricultural incomes, and agricul-
tural employment are higher under MA
and significantly higher under GMR,
compared to business as usual.
z The country’s import requirements are
biggest under business as usual but there
is a dramatic shift toward self-sufficiency
under GMR (Figure 4).10
What should be done?11
In the short term, the paramount need is to
protect food security which entails widening
access to affordable rice, whatever the source,
but with funds carefully targeted to the poor.
First, with regard to rice trade: high grain
prices offer a rare opportunity to dismantle
the expensive and inefficient regime of
protection, widen access to more affordable
rice while maintaining production incentives
for farmers. Importation should be opened up
to private traders. The rice tariff should be
cut drastically, by 50 percent or more. It
would also be timely to initiate NFA reform,
not just at the operational level (though this
is welcome), but more fundamentally, to lay
the groundwork for a comprehensive review of
its mandate and functions. Second, with
______________
10 T. Paris and D. Antiporta, 2007. External environment,
trade regimes, and policy options. In A. Balisacan, L.
Sebastian, and Associates, Securing rice, reducing poverty:
challenges and policy directions. SEARCA, PhilRice, and DA-
BAR, College, Los Baños, Laguna.
11 This section draws from A. Balisacan and L. Sebastian,
2007. Challenges and policy directions. In A. Balisacan, L.
Sebastian, and Associates, Securing rice, reducing poverty:
challenges and policy directions. SEARCA, PhilRice, and DA-
BAR, College, Los Baños, Laguna.
Figure 4: Excess of demand over domestic supply for rice
under alternative scenariosPN 2008-05
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regard to assistance, the delivery of welfare
benefits should carefully be targeted. Existing
welfare programs (e.g., conditional cash
transfers) can be scaled up, with beneficiary
selection incorporating criteria of food
vulnerability (i.e., landless farm workers,
households earning below subsistence, and so
on). Site selection for subsidized rice distri-
bution should be focused on depressed
communities and conflict areas.
In the long term, food security should be
achieved by addressing the underlying con-
straints to competitiveness. This involves,
first, a set of reforms to create a favorable
investment climate in rice trade and rural
finance. The NFA should be moved out of
active competition with the private sector,
focusing instead on its core function of
stabilizing food prices, mainly through
maintaining buffer stocks. Second, gover-
nance should be improved, by rationalizing
the national agricultural system as well as by
empowering local government units (LGUs),
private sector, and civil society in service
delivery and monitoring. Third, the agricul-
tural strategy should accelerate productivity
growth by returning to the basics of R&D,
extension, and infrastructure. To develop and
disseminate appropriate technologies, it is
imperative to improve public sector R&D
through human resource incentives, upgrading
and maintenance of facilities, identification
of research priorities and objectives, incorpo-
ration of impact assessment, and pursuance of
adaptive and participatory approaches.
Capacities of local extension personnel should
be strengthened and oriented toward client-
focused service delivery. Support for irrigation
development should involve the rehabilitation
of existing systems (rather than construction
of new large-scale national systems), expan-
sion of small-scale systems, facilitation of
private systems (e.g., shallow tubewells), and
institutional development of user associations
toward maintenance and cost recovery.
The funding requirements for investing in
productivity growth are manageable. Esti-
mates for additional operations and mainte-
nance expenses are about PhP1 billion
annually. This is about 125 percent higher
than the annual appropriation in 2000–2004,
but a fraction of the food security budget
being contemplated.
Measures to establish long-term competitive-
ness of the rice sector would not only boost
domestic rice supplies. They would also go far
in raising farm incomes, increasing purchasing
power of farmers, and triggering a virtuous
growth dynamic in the countryside. No less is
required for a sustained end to the country’s
chronic problems of food insecurity and
poverty. 